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Analogy and authority in cyberterrorism discourse:
An analysis of global news media coverage

This article explores constructions of cyberterrorism within the global news media between 2008 and 2013. It begins by arguing that the preoccupation with questions of definition, threat and response in academic literature on cyberterrorism is problematic, for two reasons. First, because it neglects the constitutivity of representations of cyberterrorism in the news media and beyond; and, second, because it prioritises policy-relevant research. To address this, the article provides a discursive analysis drawing on original empirical research into 31 news media outlets across the world. Although there is genuine heterogeneity in representations of cyberterrorism therein, we argue that constructions of this threat rely heavily on two strategies. First, appeals to authoritative or expert ‘witnesses’ and their institutional or epistemic credibility. And, second, generic or historical analogies, which help shape understanding of the likelihood and consequences of cyberterrorist attack. These strategies have particularly discursive importance, we argue, given the lack of readily available empirical examples of the ‘reality’ of cyberterrorism.
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Introduction 
The potential ramifications of a serious cyberterrorist attack enjoy periodic emergence within the global news media. A 2013 article in The Washington Post, for example, asked ‘Is the U.S. Prepared for Cyberterrorism?’;​[1]​ returning to themes raised by Fox News two years prior: ‘10 Years After 9/11, Are America's Cyberdefenses Weaker?’​[2]​ The UK’s Daily Mail reported related concerns because of an over-dependence on cyber-technology within the British national security architecture: ‘Cyber terrorists could inflict ‘fatal’ attack on Britain because Armed Forces rely so heavily on computers, MPs warn’.​[3]​ Meanwhile, also in 2010, The Australian similarly cautioned: ‘Cyber terrorism threat ‘not taken seriously enough’’.​[4]​
	Headlines such as these indicate a widespread concern with the threat posed by cyberterrorism to various referents. Indeed, as several authors have argued, the news media has been one of the most prominent sites in which this threat has been securitized. Gabriel Weimann, for instance, suggests that, ‘much of the discussion of cyberterrorism has been conducted in the popular media, where journalists typically strive for drama and sensation rather than for good operational definitions of new terms’.​[5]​ Maura Conway, more recently, notes that with ‘the aid of the mass media, cyberterrorism came to be viewed as the “new” security threat par excellence’.​[6]​ In some ways, there is little unusual here. Print, broadcast and other forms of journalism are frequently accused of exaggerating risks. What makes efforts at securitizing cyberterrorism particularly interesting, however, is that they operate in the absence of two conditions that might increase their plausibility. First, some measure of intellectual consensus that cyberterrorism does indeed pose a significant security threat. And, second, some form of substantiating empirical evidence. In other words, if media discourse does indeed demonstrate a widespread concern with this threat, that concern must be articulated and repeated without the use of possible (and especially dramatic) examples of this phenomenon, on the one hand. And, on the other hand, without invocation of a broader ‘common sense’ amongst relevant academic ‘experts’. This may help explain why, as Michael Stohl notes: ‘the media, when they report the possibilities raised by various governmental officials, bureaucrats as well as elected officials, don’t necessarily discriminate between those threats which are possible and/or probable and those which are not’.​[7]​
	This article contributes to these explorations by offering the first systematic study of media representations of cyberterrorism of its size. Specifically, it reports on original research into competing constructions of cyberterrorism published by 31 different news media outlets across the world between 1 January 2008 and 8 June 2013.  The article’s first contribution is therefore, simply, to add empirical depth to the conceptual accounts considered above. This is important because, as demonstrated below, there exists some heterogeneity within media constructions of the figure of the ‘cyberterrorist’ and the threat that s/he poses. At the same time, we are also able to demonstrate that a dominant focus on (i) the activities of offline terrorist groups within media discourse, as well as (ii) a privileging of apprehensive threat assessments around cyberterrorism adds credibility to the above fears around hyperbole and exaggeration. The article’s second – analytical – contribution is to highlight the importance of two features which are integral to this discourse yet relatively under-explored. These are, first, the importance of analogy and other forms of comparison with offline or historical events in the construction of threat scenarios. And, second, the role of specific authoritative voices – frequently from the cybersecurity industry – within media coverage, which are widely employed to make sense of the likely consequences of a cyberterrorist attack. These features, we argue, together compensate for the lack of substantiating empirical evidence within news media discourse on cyberterrorism noted above.
	The article begins with a brief review of the relevant academic literature on cyberterrorism. Here, we argue that, with few exceptions, this literature is overwhelmingly oriented toward three research questions: (i) what is cyberterrorism?, (ii) what threat does cyberterrorism pose, and to whom?, and (iii) how should this threat be countered? This orientation is problematic, we suggest, for two reasons. First, because it neglects the constitutivity of linguistic and other representations of cyberterrorism. And, second, because it prioritises problem-solving, policy-relevant research over critical enquiry. A second section situates this article within constructivist approaches to security discourse, upon which we introduce our research methodology and analysis. The article concludes by reflecting on the significance of our findings, before pointing to scope for future research.

Defining, assessing and countering cyberterrorism
Although cyberterrorism presents a comparatively recent addition to our security imaginaries,​[8]​ a burgeoning academic literature has now begun to emerge around this phenomenon. To date, three sets of questions have dominated this work. These concern: (i) the meaning of this term; (ii) the significance of the threat posed by cyberterrorism; and, (iii) appropriate forms of response to this threat.
	To begin with definitional issues, four features of the term cyberterrorism generate particular disagreement. The first is the type of conduct required for an act to be considered thus.​[9]​ Broad conceptions encompass the full range of terrorists’ online activities, from radicalisation, communication and attack planning through to fundraising, training and propaganda. For some, such an understanding has value for unpacking the plurality of ways in which the Internet has penetrated all aspects of ‘the terrorism matrix’.​[10]​ The contrasting – and dominant – view, however, is that the term should not incorporate preparatory and support activities for offline attacks, and that more is to be gained by restricting its use to actual attacks or threats thereof via digital technologies.​[11]​ This leads to a second contested feature: the harm requirement. Whilst some definitions – such as Collin’s depiction of cyberterrorism as ‘hacking with a body count’​[12]​ – insist that a cyberterrorist attack must engender physical violence against people, alternative approaches accept the possibility of other types of target and damage, such as significant economic​[13]​ or environmental damage​[14]​ or even online effects alone.​[15]​ A third contestation concerns intentionality. A common feature of many existing definitions of cyberterrorism is a political or ideological motive and the creation of fear.​[16]​ Others, however, such as Holt argue that relaxing any ‘generation of fear’ requirement is beneficial for defining cyberterrorism since it recognizes the fact that, ‘extremist groups utilize the Internet in ways that more closely resemble the characteristics of cybercrimes including the dissemination of information to incite violence and harm’.​[17]​ The final contested definitional issue concerns agency. Some stipulate that only non-state actors can perpetrate such acts.​[18]​ On this view, attacks by states are better captured via an alternative label, such as cyberwarfare or cyberespionage. However, the predominant view amongst researchers is that states are also capable of engaging in cyberterrorism, with some authors arguing that they already do so.​[19]​ 
	A second prominent debate concerns the magnitude of the cyberterrorism threat. Prominent within the ‘concerned’ literature here are hypothetical examples of the damage cyberterrorists could inflict. In an influential piece published in 1997, for instance, Collin offers several such scenarios including the disruption of air traffic control systems to cause a collision between two large civilian aircraft.​[20]​ Warnings of particular vulnerabilities within cyberspace are prominent too, with many arguing these will increase as further aspects of life migrate online.​[21]​ Wilson, for example, expresses particular concern about zero-day exploits – codes which take advantage of previously unknown vulnerabilities in computer systems – since no technical defence exists until after their discovery.​[22]​ Weimann, moreover, suggests that cyberattacks may prove attractive to terrorist groups given the wider selection of available targets, the ability to conduct attacks remotely, and the Internet’s potential for anonymity.​[23]​ More sceptical views argue cyberterrorism remains unlikely because of a range of factors including: the higher cost of cyberattacks, relative to conventional physical attacks; the complexity of such attacks, and the risks involved in outsourcing to professionals to mitigate this; the proven destructive potential of traditional methods; and, the limited media impact of cyberattacks.​[24]​ More formal cost-benefit analyses similarly conclude that the cost of perpetrating cyberattacks relative to physical attacks such as 9/11 suggests the former are likely to remain an unattractive option for terrorist groups.​[25]​
	The final debate focuses on responses to cyberterrorism. Target-hardening, including the enhanced use of firewalls to act as a form of ‘perimeter defence’​[26]​ is one frequently discussed aspect of this debate. Devising appropriate legislation to combat cyberterrorism is another prominent topic of discussion;​[27]​ however the effectiveness of enacting such laws at the domestic level has been questioned.​[28]​ This is, in part, because of the significant problems of attribution in the cyber realm, and the scope for a knowledgeable attacker to avoid detection.​[29]​ Difficulties of attribution also pose challenges for states wishing to respond to cyberattacks under international law given the ability of malicious actors to commit acts without being ‘entirely within the territory of a single sovereign’​[30]​ by routing attacks through intermediate systems prior to hitting their target​[31]​ The need for international and public/private coordination therefore attracts much attention in these literatures, ​[32]​ although cooperation at each level remains beset by considerable problems.

Cyberterrorism discourse
Despite the diversity of perspectives within the above debates, existing literature is overwhelmingly oriented toward a conception of cyberterrorism as an extra-discursive phenomenon. Whether cyberterrorism is approached narrowly or broadly, whether it is perceived as a significant or exaggerated threat, whether or not it is even deemed to have occurred, the actual or potential existence of something that may appropriately be described as ‘cyberterrorism’ is (at least) implicit in much of this work. Indeed, this general ontological consensus is precisely why the above questions are so intensely debated. Criticisms of overly expansive uses of the term are only possible because they are grounded in alternative (narrower) understandings. Sceptical retorts to hyperbolic threat scenarios, similarly, argue for a reinterpretation of risk by reworking assessments of vulnerability and the likely cost-benefit calculations would-be cyberterrorists might make.​[33]​ A correspondential approach to cyberterrorism knowledge, then, underpins these discussions in which claims are assessed or critiqued for the accuracy with which they represent reality.
	This approach to cyberterrorism as something capable of capture in our labels and risk assessments is problematic, we argue, because it neglects the constitutivity of competing knowledge claims thereof.​[34]​ Definitions and understandings of cyberterrorism - in law, scholarship, media discourse and elsewhere - create that which they only purport to describe. Cyberterrorism is produced as an identity - as well as a threat - through these very attempts to establish its meaning and significance. Such attempts, moreover, are themselves embedded in etymological and other genealogies, saturated with intertextual relations, reliant upon the positing of sameness and difference between cyberterrorism and other phenomena, and located in (open, yet contested) contexts of cultures, norms, institutions and power relations. Security issues, such as cyberterrorism, are ‘made’ through social and discursive practice, not ‘given’.​[35]​ As such, efforts to define and model it serve to reify cyberterrorism by overlooking the contingent and constructed character of this ‘threat’.​[36]​ And, this is the case of numerically-inclined as well as linguistic contributions to this literature, for, ‘even when data speak, the language with which they do so is only ever ours, including the categories and algorithms that do the mining and thus constitute the data in the first place’.​[37]​
	A related, but potentially separable limitation of much existing literature is its problem-solving emphasis.​[38]​ The importance of the question of response considered above, and its connection to ostensibly preliminary work of definition and threat assessment, indicates the value attached to policy relevance within this research. The risk here, of course, is that this reproduces an unnecessarily circumscribed conception of what scholarship should look like that has been widely critiqued within the broader fields of terrorism research and International Relations; a conception that prioritises knowledge’s instrumental rather than critical value.​[39]​ Although Cox​[40]​ - and others​[41]​ - attribute merit to problem-solving research in certain contexts, two limitations might be identified. The first is that it risks overlooking the partiality - incompleteness and situatedness - of any knowledge of (here) cyberterrorism. As Breen-Smyth suggests, paraphrasing Cox, ‘research, like theory, is from somewhere and for someone…and therefore…claims to objectivity and value-freedom are highly problematic’.​[42]​ The second is that paradigmatic norms such as these too readily facilitate the dismissal of non policy-relevant work via charges including pedantry, obscuritanism and irrelevance.​[43]​
	These problems of reification and research orientation have been addressed in relation to terrorism more generally via the emergence of a growing body of ‘critical’ work sketching the production of terrorism in discourse, practice and technologies.​[44]​ Whilst some of this self-designates as ‘critical terrorism studies’;​[45]​ much speaks to related audiences within International Relations.​[46]​ On cyberterrorism specifically, a small number of studies now also exist in which a similar meta-theoretical scepticism might be identified. Dunn Cavelty,​[47]​ for instance, employs framing theory to explore the securitization of cyberterrorism within US political discourse. Her ‘mini-case study’,​[48]​ focused on ‘official policy papers, hearings, and other statements of key actors’;​[49]​ a decision justified for her because, ‘Top-level documents reflect actual presidential intentions, as opposed to public statements of purpose, which frequently leave out sensitive details and, on occasion, directly conflict with the stated goals of the administration’.​[50]​ Maura Conway,​[51]​ similarly, sets out to ‘excavate’​[52]​ the development of ‘cyberterrorism’ through an exploration of popular, media and scholarly engagements therewith, while Bowman-Grieve engages with social psychology literature to read news media representations of ‘cyberterrorism’ through the category of ‘moral panics’.​[53]​ Her analysis highlights the importance of different authoritative voices within this process, to which we turn in our discussion below, and draws on a selection of 100 Anglo-American media sources published between 1996 and 2013. It is also possible, finally, to identify constructivist explorations of cyber-security discourse more broadly, wherein cyberterrorism is treated as one of several (discursively) connected threats. Barnand-Wills and Ashenden, for instance, draw on Foucauldian governmentality, ‘to identify a relatively consistent discourse of cyber security that involves trends of uncertainty, risk perception, securitization, and potential militarization’​[54]​ within ‘current cyber security policy developments in both the United Kingdom and United States’.​[55]​ Hansen and Nissenbaum, similarly, apply securitization theory to the 2007 cyber war against Estonia to identify, ‘three ‘‘security grammars’’ distinct to the cyber security sector: hypersecuritizations, everyday security practices, and techniﬁcations’.​[56]​
	This article seeks to advance this nascent body of research via a discourse analysis of media representations of cyberterrorism.​[57]​ In contrast to the literature discussed in the above section, it focuses not on what cyberterrorism is, nor on how ‘we’ should confront this threat. Rather, it asks how cyberterrorism is produced as an identity and a threat within the mainstream news media. This approach is applied to findings from a research project into news items published within thirty-one different international media outlets between 1 January 2008 and 8 June 2013.​[58]​ The project’s corpus was generated using a key word search for the terms <cyber terrorism>, <cyberterrorism> and <cyber terror> on the internal search engines of our identified publications. This generated a total of 535 relevant items, including news stories on current affairs, technology stories, opinion pieces, editorial reflections, cultural analysis - including reviews of fictional representations of cyberterrorism​[59]​ - and special reports.
2008 and 2013 were set as the project’s parameters for two reasons. First, because this provided sufficient data through which to explore developments in reportage on cyberterrorism: 1986 days of media content in total. And, second, because this period incorporated relevant events which had attracted considerable media coverage, including cyber-attacks on Georgia (2008), revelations of the Stuxnet attack (2010), publication of the UK’s National Security Strategy (2010), and release of the UK’s Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and Promoting the UK in a Digital World (2011). The thirty-one news outlets were chosen for: reasons of accessibility, which included the availability of a searchable online archive and English medium content;​[60]​ diversity of political perspective, given the prominence of concerns around privacy and liberty within cyberterrorism discourse; to incorporate a range of corporation types; size of readership, where possible favouring publications with the highest circulation figures; and, diversity of geographical origin, seeking to complement the study’s primary focus on news outlets in the UK, US and Australia with others from China, India, Singapore and beyond in order to facilitate international comparison.​[61]​ 
Following collection of our data, each news item was subject to a discourse analysis involving two stages. The first stage identified a range of relevant descriptive information under the following headings: Publication title; Online only publication?; Date of publication; URL; Country of publication; Article headline; Article length; and, Is there accompanying imagery, if so of what? The second stage involved an immersive reading of each article ‘through’ the following themes: What type of piece is the news item (for example is it a current affairs discussion or a technology blog)?; What is the geographical focus of the item?; What, if any, background knowledge is assumed?; Is a specific cyber event mentioned, and if so what?; Is a specific non-cyber event mentioned, and if so what?; Is cyberterrorism the primary or secondary focus, or only mentioned in passing?; How is cyberterrorism depicted (for example, is a narrow or broad understanding evident)?; To what is cyberterrorism compared or contrasted?; Are sources cited, and if so whom or what?; What referent objects are posited? How concerned is the item about the cyberterrorism threat?; How are cyberterrorists represented? What subject position is the reader invited to inhabit?; Any other information of interest or relevance? These categories were generated from our research questions as well as iteratively via analysis of the relevant academic literature and preliminary reading of our data. 
Although this article deals with research material generated across the above ‘themes’ its primary focus is upon questions relating to: representations of cyberterrorism; comparisons between cyberterrorism and other threats; and, citation or invocation of sources.​[62]​ Moreover, although many of our sources also maintain social media accounts,​[63]​ these accounts tend to focus on directing potential readers to news items. Our commitment to an immersive discourse analysis of news media coverage meant that we therefore focused our research on the news items themselves, rather than any social media output of these organisations.

Cyberterrorism and the news media
It is important to begin our analysis by noting that there is no uniform, uncontested discourse on cyberterrorism within the international news media. Distinct and frequently contrary voices may be identified therein, and uses of the term ‘cyberterrorism’ are far from consistent.​[64]​ Thus, although cyberterrorism is overwhelmingly presented as a serious, destructive and imminent threat,​[65]​ assessments of the risk this threat poses vary considerably.​[66]​ 
	A particularly prominent use of the term cyberterrorism in media discourse is with reference to the manipulation of digital technologies by those associated with offline terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigades. Occasionally such accounts hone in on newsworthy individuals such as Younis Tsouli. Tsouli – a UK resident, and active member on jihadi forums who also committed acts of cyber-crime to fund affiliated causes between 2003 and 2005 – was depicted as one of al-Qaeda’s ‘most influential cyber-terrorists’.​[67]​ Other stories adopt a more generalized position, for example warning of how Al-Qaida is plotting “cyber jihad” against Britain and the West, making use of ‘crack units to target key computer systems’.​[68]​ While these understandings distinguish ‘cyberterrorism’ from the activities of states, other accounts collapse any such distinction.​[69]​ Mikhel Tammet, Chair of Estonia's Cyber-defence Co-ordination Committee, for example, argues in a piece published by Reuters that there is nothing oxymoronic in likening Russia’s alleged 2007 attack on Estonia to ‘a kind of terrorism’: 

The act of terrorism is not to steal from a state, or even to conquer it. It is, as the word suggests, to sow terror itself. If a highly IT country cannot carry out its everyday activities, like banking, it sows terror among the people.​[70]​

North Korea’s alleged 2011 hack of a South Korean bank was portrayed in similar terms. Two stories in our sample implied this constituted cyber-terrorism; three others made an explicit connection, with two of these quoting South Korean prosecutor Kim Young-dae’s description of the hack as an ‘unprecedented act of cyber terror’.​[71]​ 
	Activist groups operating online – more widely referred to as ‘hacktivists’ – also, at times, attract this soubriquet. CNN reported that the most familiar of these groups, Anonymous, found themselves ‘dubbed cyberterrorists’.​[72]​ Another collective AntiSec’s hacking of more than 70 U.S. law enforcement institutions saw this organisation similarly described as a ‘cyberterrorist collaboration’.​[73]​ Coverage of the 2012 hack of Israeli credit card details attributed to Saudi hacker OxOmar also made frequent use of the words of Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalo,​[74]​ who argued that this constituted, ‘a breach of sovereignty comparable to a terrorist operation’.​[75]​ Meanwhile, attacks on businesses are also frequently framed as evidence of the risk of cyberterrorism​[76]​ with the widespread reporting of the following remarks by Sony’s former CEO, Sir Howard Stringer indicative here:

I think you see that cyber terrorism is now a global force, affecting many more companies than just Sony…If hackers can hack Citibank, the FBI and the CIA, and yesterday the video game company Electronics Arts, then it's a negative situation that governments may have to resolve.​[77]​

Other media reports, finally, ‘stretch’ this concept still further, with disparate activities including IRA propaganda videos​[78]​, the use of Twitter​[79]​ and hoax terrorist e-mails designated ‘cyberterrorist’.​[80]​

Analogy, authority and threat construction
Despite this flexibility in the use of the cyberterrorism lexicon, news media coverage is overwhelmingly concerned with the seriousness of this (ambiguous) threat.​[81]​ According to an article in The West Australian, for instance, ‘Islamists want to take the world back to the primitive social relations and religious ethos of the 7th century, [and] they are utilising the most advanced digital technology of the modern era in their cause’.​[82]​ The Washington Post, likewise, cites the Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Carlin to inform readers that we are ‘very vulnerable’​[83]​ to a terrorist attack on critical infrastructure. Indeed, this is a vulnerability that for, ex-executive assistant director of the FBI Shawn Henry is second only to a ‘weapon of mass destruction going off in one of our major cities’.​[84]​ 
Dissenting voices do, of course, emerge. Stephen Cummings, former director of the UK Government’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, for example, is cited in a 2008 Reuters story to suggest that cyberterrorism ‘distracts our attention from the more pressing terrorist threats, which are still physical’.​[85]​ Cummings concludes, ‘Cyberterrorism is a myth’.​[86]​ Other critics offer civil liberty concerns about the uses to which this (fabricated) threat is put. Head of the Australian Council of Civil Liberties Terry O’Gorman, for example, argues to ABC News that attempts to tighten national laws on the grounds of cyberterrorism risk, ‘losing the balance between giving the intelligence services sufficient powers to fight terrorism while at the same time keeping longstanding and cherished civil liberties’.​[87]​ These voices of caution are, however, comparatively rare​[88]​ and frequently drowned out by reports of risk and vulnerability. US Senator Dianne Feinstein’s discussion of terrorists opening the floodgates of a dam, disrupting air traffic control, or shutting down the New York Stock Exchange is given coverage in a CNN piece titled ‘There’s nothing virtual about cyber attack’.​[89]​ A 2010 article written by the Daily Mail’s Science Editor, Michael Hanlon, outlines a detailed yet entirely fictional example of cyberterrorism from the year 2017 that has catastrophic financial, energy, communication and social consequences far beyond its projected death toll of 2900. Hanlon dubs this ‘Britain’s Pearl Harbor’: an event that ‘brought one of the world’s most advanced nations almost to its knees’.​[90]​
The above examples demonstrate the importance of two features of news media cyberterrorism discourse noted in this article’s introduction. The first of these is widespread citation of, or reference to, named figures such as intelligence professionals, political elites and industry representatives with some claim to authority in the area of cyber-security. A Washington Post article of 2010, for example, cites former FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller III, in a discussion of the ‘clear interest’ terrorists have shown in pursuing ‘hacking skills’, for inflicting further damage upon ‘our economy and our psyche’.​[91]​ In the UK, former Minister for Security and Counter-terrorism Lord West of Spithead,​[92]​ and ex-MI5 Chief Jonathan Evans​[93]​ are similarly cited to reference the ability of terrorist groups to cause cyber-disruption. Former Home Secretary, David Blunkett, informs the BBC that ‘jihadists’, ‘could be planning to attack national infrastructure - power grids, telecommunications and the like - via the internet, in order to hit a big and symbolic target: the 2012 London Olympics’.​[94]​ Finally, there are industry experts such as Eugene Kaspersky who asserts that there is a real imminent danger from cyberterrorism: ‘I don’t want to speak about it’ Kaspersky argues, before suggesting: ‘…we are close, very close, to cyber terrorism. Perhaps already the criminals have sold their skills to the terrorists – and then ... oh, God’.​[95]​
Invocations of professionals such as the above within this coverage make use of two potentially separable claims to authority. The first, and most obvious, is via reference to the professional standing of the cited individual. So, the Washington Post, for instance, invokes ‘Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta [who] said that digital attacks “could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11” and virtually paralyze the country’.​[96]​ A CNN study of the credibility of cyberterrorism-related scenarios within the James Bond film, Skyfall, similarly involved conversation with: ‘Morgan Wright, a decorated former law enforcement officer who has done work relating to cyberterrorism for the United States Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense’.​[97]​ And, perhaps most strikingly, a short article written by Jim Dexter at CNN in 2010 sought to establish the “facts” on the cyber threat by gravitating towards a number of experts including the ex-National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair, ex-Senate Intelligence Chairman Dianne Feinstein, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Robert Knake of the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor Irving Lachow and Courtney Richardson of The National Defense University.​[98]​ Citations such as these make use of what Finlayson and Atkins, following Aristotle, term ‘witnesses’, understood as: ‘anyone (or anything) we bring into our speech to support our claims; anyone whose thoughts might bring insight and whom we think our audience will take seriously’.​[99]​ The persuasiveness of this use of quotation works by an ad hominem logic, in which the credentials of the ‘witness’ are appropriated in order to add credibility due to ‘the stature with which the source quoted is held (and thus on collective assumptions about what counts as a valid knowledge claim, and who can make one)’.​[100]​ Thus, in the above examples, it is the implied venerability of political executives or law enforcement officers which encourages audiences to take their arguments seriously – and the lack of such credentials which diminishes the force of dissenting voices.
The second invocation of authority within this coverage is via processes of predication through which particular properties are attributed to quoted individuals that go beyond their institutional affiliations.​[101]​ ‘Expertise’ is a particularly common attribute here, as with the BBC story on a hacking of the IMF which spoke to, ‘Tom Kellerman, a security expert who has worked for the IMF’,​[102]​ or a story from the same source which ran the following caption beneath a photograph of an individual wearing the now infamous Guy Fawkes mask: ‘Anonymous may opt for amusing disguises, but they are a real danger, according to experts’.​[103]​ 
Track records of previous accurate predictions are also cited. A Telegraph article, for instance, discusses a new book by former US National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism Richard Clarke which ‘paints a doomsday scenario’ in which terrorists annex ‘the American computer system’, noting that, ‘Mr Clarke has been right before. As anti-terrorism tsar under Mr Clinton and then Mr Bush, he issued dire warnings of the need for better defences against al-Qaeda’.​[104]​ These invocations of expertise provide an important supplement to the above references to institutional authority because of their role in affirming a ‘quality, attribute, or property of a person or thing’.​[105]​ Predicates, as Doty points out, construct identities for particular subjects,​[106]​ in this case increasing the reliability of the quoted individuals. As argued in the article’s introduction, this is particularly significant given the lack of academic agreement around the meaning or threat of cyberterrorism.  
A second prominent feature of this discourse which may also be identified in a number of the examples above is the use of analogy to concretise the potential consequences of a ‘cyberterrorist’ attack.​[107]​ At times, this involves generic comparison with physical weapons of war. ABC News, for instance, cites the British government’s warning that ‘a cyberattack on the nation’s vital computer networks could be as disastrous as a bombing’​[108]​. The Australian, similarly, reports that ‘a nation can be as easily crippled by the loss of its critical infrastructure as it can by any number of well-placed missiles’.​[109]​ Alongside such generic analogous reasoning, we also witness comparisons to specific historical events such as the Mumbai attacks of 2008,​[110]​ or – more frequently – to 9/11, Pearl Harbor, the July 7th 2005 London bombings, and even Hurricane Katrina.​[111]​ 
Fears around an electronic- or cyber- Pearl Harbor go back to the early 1990s, although these have gained traction in recent years. Remarks by Leon Panetta on this possibility were widely reported in 2012,​[112]​ although comments by former U.S. National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism, Richard Clarke, also generated coverage, as in a Daily Telegraph article titled: ‘Cyber attack “could fell US within 15 minutes”’.​[113]​ Panetta has also been widely cited in media use of the 9/11 analogy, such as the Washington Post article warning that a digital attack ‘could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11’, virtually paralysing the country.​[114]​ As former NSA director Mike McConnell similarly argued – reported in 2012 – American unpreparedness is such that Internet-savvy terrorists could pull off an attack ‘in the manner of the raids of September 11’.​[115]​ In a Guardian report of 2009, it was 9/11’s unpredictability rather than destructiveness which was put to analogous effect: ‘just as the 9/11 attacks were an unprecedented attack with unconventional weapons, so too could a major cyber attack’.​[116]​ The same newspaper also later reported on US efforts to bolster resilience to cyberterrorism through legislation ‘aimed at avoiding a cyber “Hurricane Katrina” situation in which a disaster is aggravated by a bungled government response’.​[117]​ Sami Saydjari – CEO of online security company Cyber Defence Agency – took this analogy further in an open letter to George W. Bush discussed in the BBC and the Guardian to suggest that the: ‘potential costs of a multi-critical infrastructure attack on the banking system, the power grid and so on in a sequence designed to do maximum damage approaches the trillions, and the damage would look like a thousand hurricane Katrinas’.​[118]​
The use of analogy in media coverage of cyberterrorism is vital in the construction of this security threat. Images of the destructive potential inherent to generically-framed ‘missiles’ and ‘bombs’ underscore the seriousness of ill-understood technologies and actors for readers. References to specific historical events such as Pearl Harbor, 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina do likewise, while simultaneously reminding audiences that unexpected events do occur. These analogies highlight, modulate and even camouflage aspects of the ‘threats’ being discussed, not least because events such as 9/11 have been so heavily (re)mediated that their meaning appears, almost, taken-for-granted.​[119]​ As David Mutimer argues in his discussion of proliferation metaphors​[120]​:

we must recognize that the metaphors with which a security problem is understood will shape the nature of the problem and its solutions, focusing on the aspects that are highlighted and marginalizing, or ignoring those that are downplayed or hidden in the metaphor’s entailments.

Without diminishing the power of these rhetorical figures in shaping understanding of security threats, it is important to note that analogies such as those discussed above do not go uncontested within media discourse. A piece in the Straits Times, for instance, cites Dr Irving Lachow, Senior Associate at the Centre for Strategic & International Studies, who claims that cyberterrorists ‘do not have the technical skills that are up to the mark when it comes to executing a digital attack with an impact equivalent to 9/11’. As Lachow, therefore, concludes, cyberterrorism is ‘not a likely scenario’.​[121]​ In an article for Aljazeera, similarly, Karen Greenberg discusses the ‘old alarm bell “cyber Pearl Harbor”’ in critiquing the ‘chilling image’ raised by Panetta that ‘a cyber-attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11’.​[122]​ Greenberg argues that such ‘early warnings of dire consequences’ sound ‘tediously familiar’, pointing out that in: 
the wake of the actual 9/11 attacks, governmental overreach became commonplace, based on fear-filled scenarios of future doom’ that should make us equally suspicious of ‘doomsday predictions and distrustful of claims that extraordinary measures are necessary to protect “national security”.​[123]​

Conclusion
Discourses – on security threats and anything else – are productive rather than representational: they create identities and threats while seeming only to refer to them.​[124]​ In this article, we have argued that existing academic literature on cyberterrorism has tended to neglect this insight, due to its organisation around three quite specific questions: definition, threat and response. These questions, we argued, contributed to a widespread (though not uncontested) meta-theoretical frame of reference and sense of scholarly purpose in which cyberterrorism is approached as a real-world problem to be solved. As an attempt to contribute to discursively-oriented explorations of the constitution of ‘cyberterrorism’ as cyberterrorism, we then introduced findings from our own research into the international news media. Our analysis, we argued, offered two contributions to scholarship. First, it contributes to existing accounts of the media’s importance in the framing of this ‘threat’ by adding empirical depth to this scholarship. Although some important related work exists, discussed above, this is the first study of its size focused, solely, on the construction of cyberterrorism. 
The article’s second, analytical, contribution was to highlight the importance of authority and analogy in media efforts to securitise cyberterrorism.​[125]​ Authoritative voices, we argued, are called upon as ‘witnesses’​[126]​ both to validate and (less frequently) to contest threat scenarios in this context. This is, moreover, complemented by representations of ‘expertise’ in the framing of those voices and their importance. Analogies, as explained above, are widely used to help make sense of the consequences and likelihood of potential attacks. Such analogies draw upon ‘real’ historical events as well as hypothetical constructions of future scenarios. Neither, of course, are neutral, for - as with all rhetorical figures - reference to 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, Pearl Harbor work both to augment and to de-emphasise particular aspects of the events which are being discussed.
None of this is intended to suggest that audiences of cyberterrorism news media discourse automatically internalise dominant understandings, assumptions or analogies such as those considered above. Readers of texts such as these engage in active processes of decoding in which the meaning of such texts is negotiated, and any news story may be read more or less faithfully (hence the possibility of oppositional or aberrant readings).​[127]​ This, we suggest, implies the scope for future research building on this work which could include analysis of the ways in which audiences consume cyberterrorism discourse in different media. On top of this there is clearly potential for comparative analysis of – and of intertextualities between – political and media discourse on cyberterrorism. News sources in languages other than English would offer a further point of comparison, allowing enquiry into the productivity of different languages in the construction of cyberterrorism. As, indeed, would engagement with social media discourse and non-written sources such as multi-media coverage on television or online. All of the above, we suggest, would add further empirical depth to existing conceptual accounts of the media’s role in constituting this contemporary threat. Our hope is that this article represents one step toward this.
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